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replied 2084d
Well, at least we know what is going on. So, your memo $BCH is as secure as your browser. Lose the browser, lose the funds. The more browsers, the bigger the security risk. Right?
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15,000
replied 2083d
For now yes. We plan to use multiple keys that can recover ID from compromise. The funds would still be lost though.

https://github.com/memocash/mips/blob/master/mip-0003/mip-0003.md
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1,092
replied 2083d
Generate BIP39 mnemonic, use that as seed to derive m/44'/145'/x' where x' is the service. Forget the root master and use the Memo pass to encrypt the XPRV of this account.
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6,000
replied 2083d
Love MIP 4 and 5. Keep up the good work!
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1,000
replied 2083d
If the parent key was never used for memo, and the memo.cash website itself generated child keys, then at configurable threshold sent to parent keys, you could minimize risk.
replied 2083d
Malware can search for it because the data has the same rights as you. Instead of stealing, it'll just post spam from your account. At least that's how I'd exploit it.
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777
anarchovegan
replied 2083d
Shared to memo topic:
https://memo.cash/post/af8ebc0ff4a9929805855f966796f23934c7366f386ffd0916caa0522df0ae0f
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Simon Van Gelder
replied 2083d
AFAIK only the PW is local, and signing is done via conjunction of the server key and PW. I think changing your PW would shut-off compromised browsers.
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Simon Van Gelder
replied 2083d
But if the attacker has the wherewithal to export the private key from within the account, you're out-of-luck for that address.
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