I was referring to attack resistance. If a bad actor can afford 1000 Dash they will have better prospects of success with the limit than if votes were proportional from 0, right?
I don't think you can make that assumption. Its much easier to buy 1 Dash to vote than it is to buy 1k. If you're a bad actor, 1K is an easier investment to make, 1k means your serious
Again we are debating entry level for voting vs power per coin. If we assume that 1K limit excludes 50% of holders, then those who can afford 1K will have proportionally more power.
To adopt your idea or why it should be done. It has to work better than what we've got. Right now you've only got a theoretical complaint, Dash is making real world moves. Little time.
Yes, my complaint is theoretical, but you haven't presented a theoretical defense of the current model. Dash might be working great, but it's possible it could be working even better.
And you haven't proven 1. the efficacy of the current dash model 2. the superiority of whatever model you suggest replace it. Until you can do this you are not providing any incentive
The model I propose would be proportional voting from 0 Dash and up. My reasoning is that you haven't proven any benefits for the arbitrary 1000K Dash limit.
The benefit is that it is great and expensive enough to prevent people from buying up masternodes. Sybil proof. But we were talking about the proposal fee, not the MN cost.
But that is not a good assumption to make because it presupposes that the price was always high enough to exclude 50% of holders. 1k Dash used to be really cheap for years. Bad assumpt
My point is also true at any number. W.e num you choose, you are presupposing the price was always high enough to exclude w.e. portion you picked. THAT IS NOT a good assumption to make