money; for you do not want a just man to be your counselor the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?"
"Certainly."
"And when you
partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?"
"In a money partnership."
"Yes Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of
"And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?"
"Quite the reverse."
"Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better
use."
"And by contracts you mean partnerships?"
"Exactly."
"But is the just man or the skillful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?"
"The skillful player."
shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean?"
"Yes."
"And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?"
"In contracts, Socrates, justice is of
use?"
"I am very far from thinking so."
"You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?"
"Yes."
"Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?"
"Yes."
"Or like
when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?"
"No."
"And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?"
"No."
"Then in time of peace justice will be of no
actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friends?"
"In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other."
"But
able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?"
"The physician."
"Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?"
"The pilot."
"And in what sort of
guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies."
"That is his meaning then?"
"I think so."
"And who is best
human bodies."
"And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?"
"Seasoning to food."
"And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?"
"If, Socrates, we are to be
we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?"
"He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to
for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt."
"That must have been his meaning." he said.
"By heaven!" I replied "and if
as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him-- that is to say, evil."
"Simonides then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice;
a debt,--that is what you would imagine him to say?"
"Yes."
"And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?"
"To be sure" he said "they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy,
ought always to do good to a friend and never evil."
"You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of
means to make the return?"
"Certainly not."
"When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?"
"Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend
else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt."
"True."
"Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no
but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were now saying that I ought to return a return a deposit of arms or of anything
truly say, about justice?"
"He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right."
"I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man,
not Polemarchus your heir?" I said.
"To be sure" he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.
"Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you
be believed" said Polemarchus interposing.
"I fear" said Cephalus "that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company."
"Is
condition."
"You are quite right" he replied.
"But then" I said "speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice."
"Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to
mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his
