virtue of man?"
"Certainly."
"And that human virtue is justice?"
"To be sure."
"Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?"
"That is the result."
"But can the musician
"Yes, of horses."
"And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?"
"Of course."
"And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper
both wicked and his enemies."
"When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?"
"The latter."
"Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?"
are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?"
"Yes, that appears to me to be the truth."
"But ought the just to injure any one at all?"
"Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are
"Yes."
"And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they
that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said."
"You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?"
"We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good."
"And how is the error to be corrected?"
"We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and
"Very true" he said "and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'"
"What was the error, Polemarchus?" I asked.
case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides."
ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?"
"I like that better."
"But see the consequence; Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that
and would not do an injustice?"
"True."
"Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?"
"Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral."
"Then I suppose that we
good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?"
"True."
"And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?"
"Clearly."
"But the good are just
good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil."
"Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?"
"That is true."
"Then to them the
words."
"Well, there is another question; By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?"
"Surely" he said "a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks
however `for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies; that was what you were saying?"
"No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter
is a favourite of his, affirms that
'He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.'
And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised
after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who
anything is also a good thief?"
"That, I suppose, is to be inferred."
"Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it."
"That is implied in the argument."
"Then
a disease is best able to create one?"
"True."
"And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?"
"Certainly."
"Then he who is a good keeper of
point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?"
"Certainly."
"And he who is most skillful in preventing or escaping from
the other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?"
"That is the inference."
"Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further
keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?"
"Certainly."
"And so of all
you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?"
"Clearly."
"And when you want to
to be kept safely."
"You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?"
"Precisely."
"That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?"
"That is the inference."
"And when
